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Abstract. We introduce a formal model for the information leakage of
probability distributions and define a notion called distribution privacy
as the local differential privacy for probability distributions. Roughly,
the distribution privacy of a local obfuscation mechanism means that
the attacker cannot significantly gain any information on the distribu-
tion of the mechanism’s input by observing its output. Then we show
that existing local mechanisms can hide input distributions in terms of
distribution privacy, while deteriorating the utility by adding too much
noise. For example, we prove that the Laplace mechanism needs to add a
large amount of noise proportionally to the infinite Wasserstein distance
between the two distributions we want to make indistinguishable. To im-
prove the tradeoff between distribution privacy and utility, we introduce
a local obfuscation mechanism, called a tupling mechanism, that adds
random dummy data to the output. Then we apply this mechanism to
the protection of user attributes in location based services. By experi-
ments, we demonstrate that the tupling mechanism outperforms popular
local mechanisms in terms of attribute obfuscation and service quality.
Keywords: local differential privacy · obfuscation mechanism · location
privacy · attribute privacy · Wasserstein metric · compositionality
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [1] is a quantitative notion of privacy that has been applied
to a wide range of areas, including databases, geo-locations, and social network.
The protection of differential privacy can be achieved by adding controlled noise
to given data that we wish to hide or obfuscate. In particular, a number of recent
studies have proposed local obfuscation mechanisms [2,3,4], namely, randomized
algorithms that perturb each single “point” data (e.g., a geo-location point) by
adding certain probabilistic noise before sending it out to a data collector. How-
ever, the obfuscation of a probability distribution of points (e.g., a distribution
of locations of users at home/outside home) still remains to be investigated in
terms of differential privacy.
? This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant JP17K12667,
JP19H04113, and Inria LOGIS project.
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For example, a location-based service (LBS) provider collects each user’s geo-
location data to provide a service (e.g., navigation or point-of-interest search),
and has been widely studied in terms of the privacy of user locations. As shown
in [3,5], users can hide their accurate locations by sending to the LBS provider
only approximate location information calculated by an obfuscation mechanism.
Nevertheless, a user’s location information can be used for an attacker to
infer the user’s attributes (e.g., age, gender, social status, and residence area) or
activities (e.g., working, sleeping, and shopping) [6,7,8,9]. For example, when an
attacker knows the distribution of residence locations, he may detect whether
given users are at home or outside home after observing their obfuscated loca-
tions. For another example, an attacker may learn whether users are rich or poor
by observing their obfuscated behaviors. These attributes can be used by robbers
hence should be protected from them. Privacy issues of such attribute inference
are also known in other applications, including recommender systems [10,11]
and online social networks [12,13]. However, to our knowledge, no literature has
addressed the protection of attributes in terms of local differential privacy.
To illustrate the privacy of attributes in an LBS, let us consider a running
example where users try to prevent an attacker from inferring whether they are
at home or not. Let λhome and λout be the probability distributions of loca-
tions of the users at home and outside home, respectively. Then the privacy of
this attribute means that the attacker cannot learn from an obfuscated location
whether the actual location follows the distribution λhome or λout .
This can be formalized using differential privacy. For each t ∈ {home, out},
we denote by p(y |λt) the probability of observing an obfuscated location y when
an actual location is distributed over λt. Then the privacy of t is defined by:
p(y |λhome)
p(y |λout) ≤ e
ε,
which represents that the attacker cannot distinguish whether the users follow
the distribution λhome or λout with degree of ε.
To generalize this, we define a notion, called distribution privacy (DistP),
as the differential privacy for probability distributions. Roughly, we say that a
mechanism A provides DistP w.r.t. λhome and λout if no attacker can detect
whether the actual location (input to A) is sampled from λhome or λout after he
observed an obfuscated location y (output by A)3. Here we note that each user
applies the mechanism A locally by herself, hence can customize the amount of
noise added to y according to the attributes she wants to hide.
Although existing local differential privacy mechanisms are designed to pro-
tect point data, they also hide the distribution that the point data follow. How-
ever, we demonstrate that they need to add a large amount of noise to obfuscate
distributions, and thus deteriorate the utility of the mechanisms.
To achieve both high utility and strong privacy of attributes, we introduce
a mechanism, called the tupling mechanism, that not only perturbs an actual
3 In our setting, the attacker observes only a sampled output of A, and not the exact
histogram of A’s output distribution. See Section 3.5 for more details.
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input, but also adds random dummy data to the output. Then we prove that
this mechanism provides DistP. Since the random dummy data obfuscate the
shape of the distribution, users can instead reduce the amount of noise added to
the actual input, hence they get better utility (e.g., quality of a POI service).
This implies that DistP is a relaxation of differential privacy that guarantees
the privacy of attributes while achieving higher utility by weakening the differ-
entially private protection of point data. For example, suppose that users do
not mind revealing their actual locations outside home, but want to hide (e.g.,
from robbers) the fact that they are outside home. When the users employ the
tupling mechanism, they output both their (slightly perturbed) actual locations
and random dummy locations. Since their outputs include their (roughly) ac-
tual locations, they obtain high utility (e.g., learning shops near their locations),
while their actual location points are protected only weakly by differential pri-
vacy. However, their attributes at home/outside home are hidden among the
dummy locations, hence protected by DistP. By experiments, we demonstrate
that the tupling mechanism is useful to protect the privacy of attributes, and out-
performs popular existing mechanisms (the randomized response [14], the planar
Laplace [3] and Gaussian mechanisms) in terms of DistP and service quality.
Our contributions. The main contributions of this work are given as follows:
– We propose a formal model for the privacy of probability distributions in
terms of differential privacy. Specifically, we define the notion of distribution
privacy (DistP) to represent that the attacker cannot significantly gain infor-
mation on the distribution of a mechanism’s input by observing its output.
– We provide theoretical foundation of DistP, including its useful properties
(e.g., compositionality) and its interpretation (e.g., in terms of Bayes factor).
– We quantify the effect of distribution obfuscation by existing local mech-
anisms. In particular, we show that (extended) differential privacy mech-
anisms are able to make any two distributions less distinguishable, while
deteriorating the utility by adding too much noise to protect all point data.
– For instance, we prove that extended differential privacy mechanisms (e.g.,
the Laplace mechanism) need to add a large amount of noise proportionally
to the ∞-Wasserstein distance W∞,d(λ0, λ1) between the two distributions
λ0 and λ1 that we want to make indistinguishable.
– We show that DistP is a useful relaxation of differential privacy when users
want to hide their attributes, but not necessarily to protect all point data.
– To improve the tradeoff between DistP and utility, we introduce the tupling
mechanism, which locally adds random dummies to the output. Then we
show that this mechanism provides DistP and hight utility for users.
– We apply local mechanisms to the obfuscation of attributes in location based
services (LBSs). Then we show that the tupling mechanism outperforms
popular existing mechanisms in terms of DistP and service quality.
All proofs of technical results can be found in Appendix.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some notions of privacy and metrics used in this paper.
Let N>0 be the set of positive integers, and R>0 (resp. R≥0) be the set of
positive (resp. non-negative) real numbers. Let [0, 1] be the set of non-negative
real numbers not grater than 1. Let ε, ε0, ε1 ∈ R≥0 and δ, δ0, δ1 ∈ [0, 1].
2.1 Notations for Probability Distributions
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Fig. 1: Coupling γ.
We denote by DX the set of all probability distributions over
a set X , and by |X | the number of elements in a finite set X .
Given a finite set X and a distribution λ ∈ DX , the
probability of drawing a value x from λ is denoted by λ[x].
For a finite subset X ′ ⊆ X we define λ[X ′] by: λ[X ′] =∑
x′∈X ′ λ[x
′]. For a distribution λ over a finite set X , its
support supp(λ) is defined by supp(λ) = {x ∈ X : λ[x] > 0}.
Given a λ ∈ DX and a f : X → R, the expected value of f
over λ is: Ex∼λ[f(x)]
def
=
∑
x∈X λ[x]f(x).
For a randomized algorithm A : X → DY and a set
R ⊆ Y we denote by A(x)[R] the probability that given
input x, A outputs one of the elements of R. Given a randomized algorithm
A : X → DY and a distribution λ over X , we define A#(λ) as the distribution
of the output of A. Formally, for a finite set X , the lifting of A w.r.t. X is the
function A# : DX → DY such that A#(λ)[R] def= ∑x∈X λ[x]A(x)[R].
2.2 Differential Privacy (DP)
Differential privacy [1] captures the idea that given two “adjacent” inputs x and
x′ (from a set X of data with an adjacency relation Φ), a randomized algorithm
A cannot distinguish x from x′ (with degree of ε and up to exceptions δ).
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). Let e be the base of natural logarithm.
A randomized algorithm A : X → DY provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy (DP)
w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ ⊆ X × X if for any (x, x′) ∈ Φ and any R ⊆ Y,
Pr[A(x) ∈ R] ≤ eε Pr[A(x′) ∈ R] + δ
where the probability is taken over the random choices in A.
2.3 Differential Privacy Mechanisms and Sensitivity
Differential privacy can be achieved by a privacy mechanism, namely a random-
ized algorithm that adds probabilistic noise to a given input that we want to
protect. The amount of noise added by some popular mechanisms (e.g., the ex-
ponential mechanism) depends on a utility function u : X × Y → R that maps
a pair of input and output to a utility score. More precisely, the noise is added
according to the “sensitivity” of u, which we define as follows.
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Definition 2 (Utility distance). The utility distance w.r.t a utility function
u : (X×Y)→ R is the function d given by: d(x, x′) def= maxy∈Y
∣∣u(x, y)−u(x′, y)∣∣.
Note that d is a pseudometric. Hereafter we assume that for all x, y, u(x, y) = 0
is logically equivalent to x = y. Then the utility distance d is a metric.
Definition 3 (Sensitivity w.r.t. an adjacency relation). The sensitivity of
a utility function u w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ ⊆ X × X is defined as:
∆Φ,d
def
= max
(x,x′)∈Φ
d(x, x′) = max
(x,x′)∈Φ
max
y∈Y
∣∣u(x, y)− u(x′, y)∣∣.
2.4 Extended Differential Privacy (XDP)
We review the notion of extended differential privacy [15], which relaxes DP by
incorporating a metric d. Intuitively, this notion guarantees that when two inputs
x and x′ are closer in terms of d, the output distributions are less distinguishable.
Definition 4 (Extended differential privacy). For a metric d : X ×X → R,
we say that a randomized algorithm A : X → DY provides (ε, δ, d)-extended
differential privacy (XDP) if for all x, x′ ∈ X and for any R ⊆ Y,
Pr[A(x) ∈ R] ≤ eεd(x,x′) Pr[A(x′) ∈ R] + δ.
2.5 Wasserstein Metric
We recall the notion of probability coupling as follows.
Definition 5 (Coupling). Given λ0 ∈ DX0 and λ1 ∈ DX1, a coupling of λ0
and λ1 is a γ ∈ D(X0 × X1) such that λ0 and λ1 are γ’s marginal distributions,
i.e., for each x0 ∈ X0, λ0[x0] =
∑
x′1∈X1γ[x0, x
′
1] and for each x1 ∈ X1, λ1[x1] =∑
x′0∈X0γ[x
′
0, x1]. We denote by cp(λ0, λ1) the set of all couplings of λ0 and λ1.
Example 1 (Coupling as transformation of distributions). Let us consider two
distributions λ0 and λ1 shown in Fig. 1. A coupling γ of λ0 and λ1 shows a way
of transforming λ0 to λ1. For example, γ[2, 1] = 0.1 moves from λ0[2] to λ1[1].
We then recall the ∞-Wasserstein metric [16] between two distributions.
Definition 6 (∞-Wasserstein metric). Let d be a metric over X . The ∞-
Wasserstein metric W∞,d w.r.t. d is defined by: for any λ0, λ1 ∈ DX ,
W∞,d(λ0, λ1) = min
γ∈cp(λ0,λ1)
max
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ)
d(x0, x1).
The ∞-Wasserstein metric W∞,d(λ0, λ1) represents the minimum largest
move between points in a transportation from λ0 to λ1. Specifically, in a trans-
portation γ, max(x0,x1)∈supp(γ) d(x0, x1) represents the largest move from a point
in λ0 to another in λ1. For instance, in the coupling γ in Example 1, the largest
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move is 1 (from λ0[2] to λ1[1], and from λ0[2] to λ1[3]). Such a largest move is
minimized by a coupling that achieves the ∞-Wasserstein metric. We denote
by Γ∞,d the set of all couplings that achieve the ∞-Wasserstein metric.
Finally, we recall the notion of the lifting of relations.
Definition 7 (Lifting of relations). Given a relation Φ ⊆ X × X , the lifting
of Φ is the maximum relation Φ# ⊆ DX × DX such that for any (λ0, λ1) ∈ Φ#,
there exists a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ0, λ1) satisfying supp(γ) ⊆ Φ.
Note that by Definition 5, the coupling γ is a probability distribution over Φ
whose marginal distributions are λ0 and λ1. If Φ = X ×X , then Φ# = DX ×DX .
3 Privacy Notions for Probability Distributions
In this section we introduce a formal model for the privacy of user attributes,
which is motivated in Section 1.
3.1 Modeling the Privacy of User Attributes in Terms of DP
As a running example, we consider an LBS (location based service) in which
each user queries an LBS provider for a list of shops nearby. To hide a user’s
exact location x from the provider, the user applies a randomized algorithm
A : X → DY, called a local obfuscation mechanism, to her location x, and
obtains an approximate information y with the probability A(x)[y].
To illustrate the privacy of attributes, let us consider an example in which
users try to prevent an attacker from inferring whether they are male or female
by obfuscating their own exact locations using a mechanism A. For each t ∈
{male, female}, let λt ∈ DX be the prior distribution of the location of the users
who have the attribute t. Intuitively, λmale (resp. λfemale) represents an attacker’s
belief on the location of the male (resp. female) users before the attacker observes
an output of the mechanism A. Then the privacy of t can be modeled as a
property that the attacker has no idea on whether the actual location x follows
the distribution λmale or λfemale after observing an output y of A.
This can be formalized in terms of ε-local DP. For each t ∈ {male, female},
we denote by p(y |λt) the probability of observing an obfuscated location y when
an actual location x is distributed over λt, i.e., p(y |λt) =
∑
x∈X λt[x]A(x)[y].
Then we can define the privacy of t by:
p(y |λmale)
p(y |λfemale) ≤ eε.
3.2 Distribution Privacy and Extended Distribution Privacy
We generalize the privacy of attributes (in Section 3.1) and define the notion
of distribution privacy (DistP) as the differential privacy where the input is a
probability distribution of data rather than a value of data. This notion models
a level of obfuscation that hides which distribution a data value is drawn from.
Intuitively, we say a randomized algorithm A provides DistP if, by observing an
output of A, we cannot detect from which distribution an input to A is generated.
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Definition 8 (Distribution privacy). Let ε ∈ R≥0 and δ ∈ [0, 1]. We say
that a randomized algorithm A : X → DY provides (ε, δ)-distribution privacy
(DistP) w.r.t. an adjacency relation Ψ ⊆ DX ×DX if its lifting A# : DX → DY
provides (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Ψ , i.e., for all pairs (λ, λ′) ∈ Ψ and all R ⊆ Y, we have:
A#(λ)[R] ≤ eε ·A#(λ′)[R] + δ.
We say A provides (ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t.Λ ⊆ DX if it provides (ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t. Λ2.
For example, the privacy of a user attribute t ∈ {male, female} described in
Section 3.1 can be formalized as (ε, 0)-DistP w.r.t. {λmale , λfemale}.
Mathematically, DistP is not a new notion but the DP for distributions. To
contrast with DistP, we refer to the DP for data values as point privacy.
Next we introduce an extended form of distribution privacy to a metric.
Intuitively, extended distribution privacy guarantees that when two input dis-
tributions are closer, then the output distributions must be less distinguishable.
Definition 9 (Extended distribution privacy). Let d : (DX ×DX )→ R be
a utility distance, and Ψ ⊆ DX × DX . We say that a mechanism A : X → DY
provides (ε, d, δ)-extended distribution privacy (XDistP) w.r.t. Ψ if the lifting A#
provides (ε, d, δ)-XDP w.r.t. Ψ , i.e., for all (λ, λ′) ∈ Ψ and all R ⊆ Y, we have:
A#(λ)[R] ≤ eεd(λ,λ′) ·A#(λ′)[R] + δ.
3.3 Interpretation by Bayes Factor
The interpretation of DP has been explored in previous work [17,15] using the
notion of Bayes factor. Similarly, the meaning of DistP can also be explained in
terms of Bayes factor, which compares the attacker’s prior and posterior beliefs.
Assume that an attacker has some belief on the input distribution before
observing the output values of an obfuscater A. We denote by p(λ) the prior
probability that a distribution λ is chosen as the input distribution. By observing
an output y of A, the attacker updates his belief on the input distribution. We
denote by p(λ|y) the posterior probability of λ being chosen, given an output y.
For two distributions λ0, λ1, the Bayes factor K(λ0, λ1, y) is defined as the
ratio of the two posteriors divided by that of the two priors: K(λ0, λ1, y) =
p(λ0|y)
p(λ1|y)
/p(λ0)
p(λ1)
. If the Bayes factor is far from 1 the attacker significantly updates
his belief on the distribution by observing a perturbed output y of A.
Assume that A provides (ε, 0)-DistP. By Bayes’ theorem, we obtain:
K(λ0, λ1, y) =
p(λ0|y)
p(λ1|y) ·
p(λ1)
p(λ0)
= p(y|λ0)p(y|λ1) =
A#(λ0)[y]
A#(λ1)[y]
≤ eε.
Intuitively, if the attacker believes that λ0 is k times more likely than λ1 before
the observation, then he believes that λ0 is k · eε times more likely than λ1 after
the observation. This means that for a small value of ε, DistP guarantees that
the attacker does not gain information on the distribution by observing y.
In the case of XDistP, the Bayes factor K(λ0, λ1, y) is bounded above by
eεd(λ0,λ1). Hence the attacker gains more information for a larger distance d(λ0, λ1).
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Table 1: Summary of basic properties of DistP.
Sequential composition  Ab is (εb, δb)-DistP
⇒ A1 A0 is (ε0 + ε1, (δ0 + δ1) · |Φ|)-DistP
Sequential composition • Ab is (εb, δb)-DistP
⇒ A1 •A0 is (ε0 + ε1, δ0 + δ1)-DistP
Post-processing A0 is (ε, δ)-DistP ⇒ A1 ◦A0 is (ε, δ)-DistP
Pre-processing (by c-stable T ) A is (ε, δ)-DistP ⇒ A ◦ T is (c ε, δ)-DistP
3.4 Privacy Guarantee for Attackers with Close Beliefs
In the previous sections, we assume that we know the distance between two
actual input distributions, and can determine the amount of noise required for
distribution obfuscation. However, an attacker may have different beliefs on the
distributions that are closer to the actual ones, e.g., more accurate distributions
obtained by more observations and specific situations (e.g., daytime/nighttime).
To see this, for each λ ∈ DX , let λ˜ be an attacker’s belief on λ. We say that
an attacker has (c, d)-close beliefs if each distribution λ satisfies d(λ, λ˜) ≤ c.
Then extended distribution privacy in the presence of an attacker is given by:
Proposition 1 (XDistP with close beliefs) Let A : X → DY provide (ε, d , 0)-
XDistP w.r.t. some Ψ ⊆ X × X . If an attacker has (c, d)-close beliefs, then for
all (λ0, λ1) ∈ Ψ and all R ⊆ Y, we have A#(λ˜0)[R] ≤ eε(d(λ0,λ1)+2c) ·A#(λ˜1)[R].
When the attacker’s beliefs are closer to ours, then c is smaller, hence a
stronger distribution privacy is guaranteed. See Appendix B.2 for DistP. Note
that assuming some attacker’s beliefs are inevitable also in many previous stud-
ies, e.g., when we want to protect the privacy of correlated data [18,19,20].
3.5 Difference from the Histogram Privacy
Finally, we present a brief remark on the difference between DistP and the dif-
ferential privacy of histogram publication (e.g., [21]). Roughly, a histogram pub-
lication mechanism is a central mechanism that aims at hiding a single record
x ∈ X and outputs an obfuscated histogram, e.g., a distribution µ ∈ DY, whereas
a DistP mechanism is a local mechanism that aims at hiding an input distribution
λ ∈ DX and outputs a single perturbed value y ∈ Y.
Note that neither of these implies the other. The ε-DP of a histogram pub-
lication mechanism means that for any two adjacent inputs x, x′ ∈ X and any
histogram µ ∈ DY, p(µ|x)p(µ|x′) ≤ eε. However, this does not derive ε-DistP, i.e., for
any adjacent input distributions λ, λ′ ∈ DX and any output y ∈ Y, p(y|λ)p(y|λ′) ≤ eε.
4 Basic Properties of Distribution Privacy
In Table 1, we show basic properties of DistP.(See Appendices B.4 and B.5 for
the details.)
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The composition A1A0 means that an identical input x is given to two DistP
mechanisms A0 and A1, whereas the composition A1•A0 means that independent
inputs xb are provided to mechanisms Ab [22]. The compositionality can be
used to quantify the attribute privacy against an attacker who obtains multiple
released data each obfuscated for the purpose of protecting a different attribute.
For example, let Ψ = {(λmale , λfemale), (λhome , λout)}, and A0 (resp. A1) be
a mechanism providing ε0-DistP (resp. ε1-DistP) w.r.t. Ψ . When A0 (resp. A1)
obfuscates a location x0 for the sake of protecting male/female (resp. home/out),
then both male/female and home/out are protected with (ε0 + ε1)-DistP.
As for pre-processing, the stability notion is different from that for DP:
Definition 10 (Stability). Let c ∈ N>0, Ψ ⊆ DX × DX , and W be a metric
over DX . A transformation T : DX → DX is (c, Ψ)-stable if for any (λ0, λ1) ∈ Ψ ,
T (λ0) can be reached from T (λ1) at most c-steps over Ψ . Analogously, T : DX →
DX is (c,W )-stable if for any λ0, λ1 ∈ DX , W (T (λ0), T (λ1)) ≤ cW (λ0, λ1).
We present relationships among privacy notions in Appendices B.3 and B.7
An important property is that when the relation Ψ ⊆ DX ×DX includes pairs of
point distributions (i.e., distributions having single points with probability 1),
DistP (resp. XDistP) implies DP (resp. XDP). In contrast, if Ψ does not include
pairs of point distributions, DistP (resp. XDistP) may not imply DP (resp. XDP),
as in Section 6.
5 Distribution Obfuscation by Point Obfuscation
In this section we present how the point obfuscation mechanisms (including DP
and XDP mechanisms) contribute to the obfuscation of probability distributions.
(See Appendix B.1 for the proofs.)
5.1 Distribution Obfuscation by DP Mechanisms
We first show every DP mechanism provides DistP. (See Definition 7 for Φ#.)
Theorem 1 ((ε, δ)-DP ⇒ (ε, δ · |Φ|)-DistP) Let Φ ⊆ X × X . If A : X → DY
provides (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Φ, then it provides (ε, δ · |Φ|)-DistP w.r.t. Φ#.
This means that the mechanism A makes any pair (λ0, λ1) ∈ Φ# indistin-
guishable up to the threshold ε and with exceptions δ · |Φ|. Intuitively, when λ0
and λ1 are adjacent w.r.t. the relation Φ
#, we can construct λ1 from λ0 only by
moving mass from λ0[x0] to λ1[x1] where (x0, x1) ∈ Φ (i.e., x0 is adjacent to x1).
Example 2 (Randomized response). By Theorem 1, the (ε, 0)-DP randomized
response [14] and RAPPOR [4] provide (ε, 0)-DistP. When we use these mecha-
nisms, the estimation of the input distribution is harder for a smaller ε. However,
these DP mechanisms tend to have small utility, because they add much noise
to hide not only the input distributions, but everything about inputs.
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5.2 Distribution Obfuscation by XDP Mechanisms
Compared to DP mechanisms, XDP mechanisms are known to provide better
utility. Alvim et al. [23] show the planar Laplace mechanism [3] adds less noise
than the randomized response, since XDP hides only closer locations. However,
we show XDP mechanisms still need to add much noise proportionally to the∞-
Wasserstein distance between the distributions we want make indistinguishable.
The ∞-Wasserstein distance W∞,d as Utility Distance We first observe
how much ε′ is sufficient for an ε′-XDP mechanism (e.g., the Laplace mechanism)
to make two distribution λ0 and λ1 indistinguishable in terms of ε-DistP.
Suppose that λ0 and λ1 are point distributions such that λ0[x0] = λ1[x1] = 1
for some x0, x1 ∈ X . Then an ε′-XDP mechanism A satisfies:
D∞(A#(λ0)‖A#(λ1)) = D∞(A(x0)‖A(x1)) ≤ ε′d(x0, x1).
In order for A to provide ε-DistP, ε′ should be defined as εd(x0,x1) . That is, the
noise added by A should be proportional to the distance between x0 and x1.
To extend this to arbitrary distributions, we need to define a utility metric
between distributions. A natural possible definition would be the largest distance
between values of λ0 and λ1, i.e., the diameter over the supports defined by:
diam(λ0, λ1) = max
x0∈supp(λ0),x1∈supp(λ1)
d(x0, x1).
However, when there is an outlier in λ0 or λ1 that is far from other values in the
supports, then the diameter diam(λ0, λ1) is large. Hence the mechanisms that
add noise proportionally to the diameter would lose utility too much.
To have better utility, we employ the ∞-Wasserstein metric W∞,d . The idea
is that given two distributions λ0 and λ1 over X , we consider the cost of a
transportation of weights from λ0 to λ1. The transportation is formalized as a
coupling γ of λ0 and λ1 (see Definition 5), and the cost of the largest move is
∆supp(γ),d = max
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ)
d(x0, x1), i.e., the sensitivity w.r.t. the adjacency rela-
tion supp(γ) ⊆ X × X (Definition 3). The minimum cost of the largest move is
given by the ∞-Wasserstein metric: W∞,d(λ0, λ1) = min
γ∈cp(λ0,λ1)
∆supp(γ),d .
XDP implies XDistP We show every XDP mechanism provides XDistP with the
metric W∞,d . To formalize this, we define a lifted relation Φ
#
W∞ as the maximum
relation over DX s.t. for any (λ0, λ1) ∈ Φ#W∞ , there is a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ0, λ1)
satisfying supp(γ) ⊆ Φ and γ ∈ Γ∞,d(λ0, λ1). Then Φ#W∞ ⊆ Φ# holds.
Theorem 2 ((ε, d , δ)-XDP⇒(ε,W∞,d , δ ·|Φ|)-XDistP) If A :X → DY provides
(ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ ⊆ X ×X , it provides (ε,W∞,d , δ ·|Φ|)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ#W∞ .
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Algorithm 1 Tupling mechanism Q tpk,ν,A
Input: x: input, k: #dummies, ν: distribution of dummies, A: randomized algorithm
Output: y = (r1, . . . , ri, s, ri+1, . . . , rk): the output value of the tupling mechanism
s
$← A(x) ; // Draw an obfuscated value s of an input x
r1, r2, . . . , rk
$← ν ; // Draw k dummies from a given distribution ν
i
$← {1, 2, . . . , k + 1} ; // Draw i to decide the order of the outputs
return (r1, . . . , ri, s, ri+1, . . . , rk) ;
By Theorem 2, when δ > 0, the noise required for obfuscation is propor-
tional to |Φ|, which is at most the domain size squared |X |2. This implies that
for a larger domain X , the Gaussian mechanism is not suited for distribution
obfuscation. We will demonstrate this by experiments in Section 7.4.
In contrast, the Laplace/exponential mechanisms provide (ε,W∞,d , 0)-DistP.
Since W∞,d(λ0, λ1) ≤ diam(λ0, λ1), the noise added proportionally to W∞,d can
be smaller than diam. This implies that obfuscating a distribution requires less
noise than obfuscating a set of data. However, the required noise can still be
very large when we want to make two distant distributions indistinguishable.
6 Distribution Obfuscation by Random Dummies
In this section we introduce a local mechanism called a tupling mechanism to
improve the tradeoff between DistP and utility, as motivated in Section 1.
6.1 Tupling Mechanism
We first define the tupling mechanism as a local mechanism that obfuscates a
given input x by using a point perturbation mechanism A (not necessarily in
terms of DP or XDP), and that also adds k random dummies r1, r2, . . . , rk to
the output to obfuscate the input distribution (Algorithm 1). The probability
that given an input x, the mechanism Q tpk,ν,A outputs y¯ is given by Q
tp
k,ν,A(x)[y¯].
6.2 Privacy of the Tupling Mechanism
Next we show that the tupling mechanism provides DistP w.r.t. the following
class of distributions. Given β, η ∈ [0, 1] and A : X → DY, we define Λβ,η,A by:
Λβ,η,A =
{
λ ∈ DX | Pr[y $← Y : A#(λ)[y] ≤ β] ≥ 1− η}.
For instance, a distribution λ satisfying maxx λ[x] ≤ β belongs to Λβ,0,A. (See
Proposition 12 in Appendix B.8.)
Theorem 3 (DistP of the tupling mechanism) Let k ∈ N>0, ν be the uni-
form distribution over Y, A : X → DY, and β, η ∈ [0, 1]. Given an 0 < α < k|Y| ,
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let εα = ln
k+(α+β)·|Y|
k−α·|Y| and δα = 2e
− 2α2
kβ2 + η. Then the (k, ν,A)-tupling mecha-
nism provides (εα, δα)-DistP w.r.t. Λ
2
β,η,A.
This claim states that just adding random dummies achieves DistP without
any assumption on A (e.g., A does not have to provide DP). For a smaller range
size |Y| and a larger number k of dummies, we obtain a stronger DistP.
Note that the distributions protected by Q tpk,ν,A belong to the set Λβ,η,A.
– When β = 1, Λβ,η,A is the set of all distributions (i.e., Λ1,η,A = DX ) while
εα and δα tend to be large.
– For a smaller β, the set Λβ,η,A is smaller while εα and δα are smaller; that is,
the mechanism provides a stronger DistP for a smaller set of distributions.
– If A provides εA-DP, Λβ,η,A goes to DX for εA → 0. More generally, Λβ,η,A
is larger when the maximum output probability maxy A
#(λ)[y] is smaller.
In practice, even when εA is relatively large, a small number of dummies enables
us to provide a strong DistP, as shown by experiments in Section 7.
We note that Theorem 3 may not imply DP of the tupling mechanism, de-
pending on A. For example, suppose that A is the identity function. For small εα
and δα, we have β  1, hence no point distribution λ (where λ[x] = 1 for some x)
belongs to Λβ,η,A, namely, the tupling mechanism does not provide (εα, δα)-DP.
6.3 Service Quality Loss and Cost of the Tupling Mechanism
When a mechanism outputs a value y closer to the original input x, she obtains a
larger utility, or equivalently, a smaller service quality loss d(x, y). For example,
in an LBS (location based service), if a user located at x submits an obfuscated
location y, the LBS provider returns the shops near y, hence the service quality
loss can be expressed as the Euclidean distance d(x, y)
def
= ‖x− y‖.
Since each output of the tupling mechanism consists of k + 1 elements, the
quality loss of submitting a tuple y¯ = (y1, y2, . . . , yk+1) amounts to d(x, y¯):=mini
d(x, yi). Then the expected quality loss of the mechanism is defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism). For a
λ ∈ DX and a metric d : X × Y → R, the expected quality loss of Q tpk,ν,A is:
L
(
Q tpk,ν,A
)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y¯∈Yk+1 λ[x] Q
tp
k,ν,A(x)[y¯] mini d(x, yi).
For a larger number k of random dummies, mini d(x, yi) is smaller on av-
erage, hence L
(
Q tpk,ν,A
)
is also smaller. Furthermore, thanks to the distribution
obfuscation by random dummies, we can instead reduce the perturbation noise
added to the actual input x to obtain the same level of DistP. Therefore, the
service quality is much higher than existing mechanisms, as shown in Section 7.
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Fig. 2: Empirical DistP and quality loss of Q tpk,ν,A for the attribute male/female.
6.4 Improving the Worst-Case Quality Loss
As a point obfuscation mechanism A used in the tupling mechanism Q tpk,ν,A,
we define the restricted Laplace (RL) mechanism below. Intuitively, (εA, r)-RL
mechanism adds εA-XDP Laplace noise only within a radius r of the original loca-
tion x. This ensures that the worst-case quality loss of the tupling mechanisms
is bounded above by the radius r, whereas the standard Laplace mechanism
reports a location y that is arbitrarily distant from x with a small probability.
Definition 12 (RL mechanism). Let Yx,r = {y′ ∈ Y | d(x, y′) ≤ r}. We
define (εA, r)-restricted Laplace (RL) mechanism as the A : X → DY defined by:
A(x)[y] = e
−εd(x,y)∑
y′∈Yx,r e
−εd(x,y′) if y ∈ Yx,r, and A(x)[y] = 0 otherwise.
Since the support of A is limited to Yx,r, A provides better service quality
but does not provide DP. Nevertheless, as shown in Theorem 3, Q tpk,ν,A provides
DistP, due to dummies in Y \ Yx,r. This implies that DistP is a relaxation of
DP that guarantees the privacy of attributes while achieving higher utility by
weakening the DP protection of point data. In other words, DistP mechanisms
are useful when users want both to keep high utility and to protect the attribute
privacy more strongly than what a DP mechanism can guarantee (e.g., when
users do not mind revealing their actual locations outside home, but want to hide
from robbers the fact that they are outside home, as motivated in Section 1).
7 Application to Attribute Privacy in LBSs
In this section we apply local mechanisms to the protection of the attribute pri-
vacy in location based services (LBSs) where each user submits her own location
x to an LBS provider to obtain information relevant to x (e.g., shops near x).
7.1 Experimental Setup
We perform experiments on location privacy in Manhattan by using the Foursquare
dataset (Global-scale Check-in Dataset) [24]. We first divide Manhattan into
14 Y. Kawamoto et al.
11 × 10 regions with 1.0km intervals. To provide more useful information to
users in crowded regions, we further re-divide these regions to 276 regions by
recursively partitioning each crowded region into four until each resulting region
has roughly similar population density.4 Let Y be the set of those 276 regions,
and X be the set of the 228 regions inside the central 10km× 9km area in Y.
As an obfuscation mechanism Q, we use the tupling mechanism Q tpk,ν,A that
uses an (εA, r)-RL mechanism A and the uniform distribution ν over Y to gener-
ate dummy locations. Note that ν is close to the population density distribution
over Y, because each region in Y is constructed to have roughly similar popu-
lation density. In the definitions of the RL mechanism and the quality loss, we
use the Euclidean distance ‖ · ‖ between the central points of the regions.
In the experiments, we measure the privacy of user attributes, formalized
as DistP. For example, let us consider the attribute male/female. For each t ∈
{male, female}, let λt ∈ DX be the prior distribution of the location of the users
having the attribute t. Then, λmale (resp. λfemale) represents an attacker’s belief
on the location of the male (resp. female) users. We define these as the empirical
distributions that the attacker can calculate from the above Foursquare dataset.
7.2 Evaluation of the Tupling Mechanism
Distribution privacy We demonstrate by experiments that the male users
cannot be recognized as which of male or female in terms of DistP. In Fig. 2,
we show the experimental results on the DistP of the tupling mechanism Q tpk,ν,A.
For a larger number k of dummy locations, we have a stronger DistP (Fig. 2a).
For a larger εA, (εA, 0.020)-RL mechanism A adds less noise, hence the tupling
mechanism provides a weaker DistP (Fig. 2b)5. For a larger radius r, the RL
mechanism A spreads the original distribution λmale and thus provides a strong
DistP (Fig. 2c). We also show the relationship between k and DistP in the east-
ern/western Tokyo and London, which have different levels of privacy (Fig. 3).
These results imply that if we add more dummies, we can decrease the noise
level/radius of A to have better utility, while keeping the same level ε of DistP.
Conversely, if A adds more noise, we can decrease the number k of dummies.
Expected quality loss In Fig. 2d, we show the experimental results on the
expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism. For a larger εA, A adds less noise,
hence the loss is smaller. We confirm that for more dummy data, the expected
quality loss is smaller. Unlike the planar Laplace mechanism (PL), A ensures
that the worst quality loss is bounded above by the radius r. Furthermore, for a
smaller radius r, the expected loss is also smaller as shown in Fig. 2d.
4 This partition may be useful to achieve smaller values (ε, δ) of DistP, because β tends
to be smaller when the population density is closer to the uniform distribution.
5 In Fig. 2b, for εA → 0, ε does not converge to 0, since the radius r = 0.020 of RL
does not cover the whole Y. However, if r ≥ maxx,y ‖x− y‖, ε converges to 0.
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7.3 Appropriate Parameters
We define the attack success rate (ASR) as the ratio that the attacker succeeds
to infer a user has an attribute when she does actually. We use an inference
algorithm based on the Bayes decision rule [25] to minimize the identification
error probability when the estimated posterior probability is accurate [25].
In Fig. 4, we show the relationships between DistP and ASR in Manhattan
for the attribute home, meaning the users located at their home. In theory,
ASR = 0.5 represents the attacker learns nothing about the attribute, whereas
the empirical ASR in our experiments fluctuates around 0.5. This seems to be
caused by the fact that the dataset and the number of locations are finite. From
Fig. 4, we conclude that ε = 1 is an appropriate parameter for (ε, 0.001)-DistP
to achieve ASR = 0.5 in our setting, and we confirm this for other attributes.
However, we note that this is an empirical criterion possibly depending on our
setting, and the choice of ε for DistP can be as controversial as that for DP and
should also be investigated using approaches for DP (e.g., [26]) in future work.
In Appendices A.1, A.2, and A.3, we show that different levels of DistP
are achieved for different attributes in different cities. In particular, we present
appropriate parameters for the tupling mechanism for various attributes in a
couple of cities.
7.4 Comparison of Obfuscation Mechanisms
We demonstrate that the tupling mechanism (TM) outperforms the popular
mechanisms: the randomized response (RR), the planar Laplace (PL), and the
planar Gaussian (PG). In Fig. 5 we compare these concerning the relationship
between ε-DistP and expected quality loss. Since PG always has some δ, it pro-
vides a weaker DistP than PL for the same quality loss. We also confirm that
PL has smaller loss than RR, since it adds noise proportionally to the distance.
Comparison using other attributes can be found in Appendix A.1.
Finally, we briefly discuss the computational cost of the tupling mechanism
Q tpk,ν,A, compared to PL. In the implementation, for a larger domain X , PL
deals with a larger size |X | × |Y| of the mechanism’s matrix, since it outputs
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each region with a non-zero probability. In contrast, since the RL mechanism A
used in Q tpk,ν,A maps each location x to a region within a radius r of x, the size
of A’s matrix is |X | × |Yx,r|, requiring much smaller memory space than PL.
Furthermore, the users of TM can simply ignore the responses to dummy
queries, whereas the users of PL need to select relevant POIs (point of interests)
from a large radius of x, which could cost computationally for many POIs.
Therefore, TM is more suited to be used in mobile environments than PL.
8 Related Work
Differential privacy. Since the seminal work of Dwork [1] on DP, a number
of its variants have been studied to provide different privacy guarantees; e.g., f -
divergence privacy [27], d-privacy [15], Pufferfish privacy [19], local DP [2], and
utility-optimized local DP [28]. All of these are intended to protect the input
data rather than the input distributions. Note that distributional privacy [29] is
different from DistP and does not aim at protecting the privacy of distributions.
To our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates the differential pri-
vacy of probability distributions lying behind the input. However, a few studies
have proposed related notions. Jelasity et al. [30] propose distributional differen-
tial privacy w.r.t. parameters θ and θ′ of two distributions, which aims at pro-
tecting the privacy of the distribution parameters but is defined in a Bayesian
style (unlike DP and DistP) to satisfy that for any output sequence y, p(θ|y) ≤
eεp(θ′|y). After a preliminary version of this paper appeared in arXiv [31], a
notion generalizing DistP, called profile based privacy, is proposed in [32].
Some studies are technically related to our work. Song et al. [20] propose the
Wasserstein mechanism to provide Pufferfish privacy, which protects correlated
inputs. Fernandes et al. [33] introduce Earth mover’s privacy, which is technically
different from DistP in that their mechanism obfuscates a vector (a bag-of-words)
instead of a distribution, and perturbs each element of the vector. Sei et al. [34]
propose a variant of the randomized response to protect individual data and
provide high utility of database. However, we emphasize again that our work
differs from these studies in that we aim at protecting input distributions.
Location privacy. Location privacy has been widely studied in the literature,
and its survey can be found in [35]. A number of location obfuscation methods
have been proposed so far, and they can be broadly divided into the following
four types: perturbation (adding noise) [36,3,5], location generalization (merg-
ing regions) [37,38], and location hiding (deleting) [37,39], and adding dummy
locations [40,41,42]. Location obfuscation based on DP (or its variant) have also
been widely studied, and they can be categorized into the ones in the centralized
model [43,44] and the ones in the local model [3,5]. However, these methods aim
at protecting locations, and neither at protecting users’ attributes (e.g., age,
gender) nor activities (e.g., working, shopping) in a DP manner. Despite the fact
that users’ attributes and activities can be inferred from their locations [6,7,8],
to our knowledge, no studies have proposed obfuscation mechanisms to provide
rigorous DP guarantee for such attributes and activities.
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9 Conclusion
We have proposed a formal model for the privacy of probability distributions and
introduced the notion of distribution privacy (DistP). Then we have shown that
existing local mechanisms deteriorate the utility by adding too much noise to
provide DistP. To improve the tradeoff between DistP and utility, we have intro-
duced the tupling mechanism and applied it to the protection of user attributes
in LBSs. Then we have demonstrated that the tupling mechanism outperforms
popular local mechanisms in terms of attribute obfuscation and service quality.
As future work, we will improve the theoretical bound on ε for the tupling
mechanism. We also plan to design optimal mechanisms that minimize the qual-
ity loss and computational costs, while providing DistP, in various applications.
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A Experimental Results
A.1 Experimental Comparison among Attributes in Manhattan
In this section we present the experimental results on more attributes of users
in the location data in Manhattan. We investigate the following four attributes:
– social/less-social (Fig. 9) represent whether a user’s social status (defined
in [45] as the number of followers divided by the number of followings) is
greater than 5 or not. In [9], the social status is regarded as a private attribute
that can be leaked by the user’s behaviour and should be protected. We set
5 to be a threshold, because mobility patterns of people are substantially
different when their social status is greater than 5 [45].
– workplace/non-workplace (Fig. 10) represent whether a user is at office or
not. This attribute can be sensitive when it implies users are unemployed.
– home/out (Fig. 11) represent whether a user is at home or not. This attribute
should be protected, for instance, from robbers [46].
– north/south (Fig. 12) represent whether a user’s home is located in the north-
ern or southern Manhattan. This attribute needs to be protected, for in-
stance, from stalkers. However, the residential area is highly correlated with
visited places, hence can be inferred by the current location relatively easily.
Note that these figures also show the results of KL-DistP, which is not defined
in this paper but is introduced in [47].
Compared to the attribute of male/female (Fig. 2), the attributes home/out
(Fig. 11) and north/south (Fig. 12) require more noise for distribution obfus-
cation. This is because the distances between the two distributions of users of
these attributes are larger than that of λmale and λfemale . The histograms for
male/female and for north/south are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 respectively.
We also show the comparison of different obfuscation mechanisms for various
attributes in Fig. 6.
A.2 Experimental Comparison among Time Periods in Manhattan
In this section we present the experimental results on different periods of time:
00h-05h, 06h-11h, 12h-17h, and 18h-23h in Manhattan in Figs. 13 to 16. It can
be seen that ε depends on a period of time. For example, hiding the attribute
male/female and social/less-social requires more noise in 06h-11h. This might
be related to the fact that more social people tend to attend social events in the
morning. On the other hand, the attribute home/out requires similar amount of
noise in any period of time. This implies that residential areas are distant from
other areas in each city, and this fact does not change over time.
A.3 Experimental Comparison among Various Cities
In this section we compare the experimental results on five cities: Manhattan,
eastern Tokyo, western Tokyo, London, and Paris. In Table 3 we show examples
Local Obfuscation Mechanisms for Hiding Probability Distributions 21
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 0.06  0.08  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 lo
ss
ε-DistP
PG
RR
PL
TM
(a) Relationship between (ε, 0.001)-DistP
and expected loss for male/female.
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 0.22  0.24  0.26  0.28  0.3  0.32  0.34  0.36  0.38
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 lo
ss
ε-DistP
PG
RR
PL
TM
(b) Relationship between (ε, 0.001)-DistP
and expected loss for social/less-social.
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 lo
ss
ε-DistP
PG
RR
PL
TM
(c) Relationship between (ε, 0.001)-DistP
and loss for workplace/non-workplace.
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 lo
ss
ε-DistP
PG
RR
PL
TM
(d) Relationship between (ε, 0.001)-DistP
and expected loss for home/out.
Fig. 6: Comparison of the randomized response (RR), the planar Laplace mech-
anism (PL), the planar Gaussian mechanism (PG), and the tupling mechanism
(TM) Q tpk,ν,A with k = 10 dummies and a radius r = 0.020. The experiments are
performed for the location data in Manhattan.
of parameters that achieve the same levels of DistP in different cities. More
detailed comparison among those cities is shown in Fig. 17 (male/female), Fig. 18
(social/less-social), Fig. 19 (workplace/non-workplace), and Fig. 20 (home/out).
When we use the same parameters in the tupling mechanism, the levels ε of
DistP differ among those cities. In western Tokyo, for instance, the attributes
social/less-social and workplace/non-workplace are more difficult to hide. This
implies that areas for social events and workplace might be more separated from
the other areas in western Tokyo. Since each attribute in each city may require
different levels of noise for distribution obfuscation, the reference parameters
(e.g., those shown in Table 3) would be useful to select appropriate parameters
for the tupling mechanism to protect the privacy of attributes in different cities.
A.4 Theoretical/Empirical Values of ε-DistP
In Table 2, we show the theoretical values of ε calculated by Theorem 3 for
δ = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1. Compared to the experimental results, those theoretical
values can only give loose upper bounds on ε. This is because the concentration
inequality used to derive Theorem 3 give loose bounds.
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Table 2: Theoretical/empirical ε-DistP of Q tpk,ν,A (k = 10, εA = 10, r = 0.020).
δ = 0.001 δ = 0.01 δ = 0.1
Theoretical bounds 2.170 1.625 1.140
Empirical values 0.04450 0.03534 0.02295
Table 3: The number k of dummies required for achieving DistP in different cities
(MH = Manhattan, TKE = Tokyo (east), TKW = Tokyo (west), LD = London,
PR = Paris) when εA = 100 and r = 0.020. Note that the data of Paris for
male/female are excluded because of the insufficient sample size.
MH TKE TKW LD PR
(0.25, 0.001)-DistP for male / female 2 >20 5 10 —
(0.50, 0.001)-DistP for social / less social 2 3 >20 2 3
(1.00, 0.001)-DistP for work / non-work 2 2 >20 1 2
(1.50, 0.001)-DistP for home / outside 3 5 >20 >20 4
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Fig. 9: Empirical DistP and loss for attribute social/less-social in Manhattan.
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Fig. 10: Empirical DistP and loss for workplace/non-workplace in Manhattan.
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Fig. 11: Empirical DistP and loss for the attribute home/out in Manhattan.
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Fig. 12: Empirical DistP and loss for the attribute north/south in Manhattan.
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Fig. 13: Empirical DistP and loss for male/female in different hours.
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Fig. 14: Empirical DistP and loss for social/less-social in different hours.
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Fig. 15: Empirical DistP and loss for workplace/non-workplace in different hours.
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 4  8  12
(ε,
 
0.
00
1)
-D
ist
P
Number of dummies
00h-05h
06h-11h
12h-17h
18h-23h
(a) Relationship
between ε-DistP and
#dummies (when
using (100, 0.020)-
RL mechanism).
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 1  4  16  64  256  1024  4096
(ε,
 
0.
00
1)
-D
ist
P
ε
A
 of restricted Laplace noise
00h-05h
06h-11h
12h-17h
18h-23h
(b) Relationship be-
tween ε-DistP and
εA of (εA, 0.020)-RL
mechanism (with 10
dummies).
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04
(ε,
 
0.
00
1)
-D
ist
P
Radius r of restricted Laplace noise
00h-05h
06h-11h
12h-17h
18h-23h
(c) Relationship be-
tween ε-DistP and a
radius r of (100, r)-
RL mechanism (with
10 dummies).
 0
 0.002
 0.004
 0.006
 0.008
 0.01
 0.012
 1  4  16  64  256  1024  4096
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 lo
ss
ε
A
 of restricted Laplace noise
 00h-05h
 06h-11h
 12h-17h
 18h-23h
(d) Relationship be-
tween the expected
loss and εA of (εA,
r)-RL mechanism
(with 5 dummies).
Fig. 16: Empirical DistP and loss for home/out in different hours.
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Fig. 17: Empirical DistP and loss for male/female in different cities.
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Fig. 18: Empirical DistP and loss for social/less-social in different cities.
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Fig. 19: Empirical DistP and loss for workplace/non-workplace in different cities.
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B Proofs of Technical Results
B.1 Distribution Obfuscation by Point Obfuscation
In this section we show the results on how point obfuscation mechanisms provide
distribution privacy.
Theorem 1 ((ε, δ)-DP ⇒ (ε, δ · |Φ|)-DistP) Let Φ ⊆ X × X . If A : X → DY
provides (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Φ, then it provides (ε, δ · |Φ|)-DistP w.r.t. Φ#.
Proof. Assume A provides (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Φ. Let δ′ = δ · |Φ|, and (λ0, λ1) ∈ Φ#.
By Definition 7, there is a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ0, λ1) satisfying supp(γ) ⊆ Φ. By
Definition 5, we have:
for each x0 ∈ X , λ0[x0] =
∑
x1∈X γ[x0, x1] (1)
for each x1 ∈ X , λ1[x1] =
∑
x0∈X γ[x0, x1]. (2)
Let R ⊆ Y such that A#(λ0)[R] > δ′. We first show that A#(λ1)[R] > 0
as follows. To derive a contradiction, we assume A#(λ1)[R] = 0. Then for any
x1 ∈ supp(λ1), A(x1)[R] = 0. Let Sx1 = {x0 ∈ X | (x0, x1) ∈ Φ}. For any
x0 ∈ Sx1 , we have:
A(x0)[R] ≤ eεA(x1)[R] + δ (by the (ε, δ)-DP of A w.r.t.Φ)
≤ δ (by A(x1)[R] = 0)
Thus we obtain:
A#(λ0)[R] =
∑
x0∈supp(λ0)
λ0[x0]A(x0)[R]
≤ |supp(λ0)| · δ
≤ |Φ| · δ (by |supp(λ0)| ≤ |supp(γ)| ≤ |Φ|)
= δ′
This contradicts the definition of R. Hence A#(λ1)[R] > 0.
Then we calculate the ratio of the probability that A# outputs an element
of R given input λ0 to that given input λ1:
A#(λ0)[R]− δ′
A#(λ1)[R]
=
(∑
x0∈X λ0[x0] ·A(x0)[R]
)− δ′∑
x1∈X λ1[x1] ·A(x1)[R]
=
∑
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ)
(
γ[x0, x1]A(x0)[R]− δ′|supp(γ)|
)∑
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ) γ[x0, x1]A(x1)[R]
(by (1), (2))
≤ max
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ)
γ[x0, x1] ·A(x0)[R]− δ′|supp(γ)|
γ[x0, x1] ·A(x1)[R]
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≤ max
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ)
A(x0)[R]− δ
A(x1)[R]
(by − δ·|Φ|
γ[x0,x1]·|supp(γ)|≤−δ)
≤ eε. (by (x0, x1) ∈ supp(γ) ⊆ Φ and (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Φ)
Therefore A provides (ε, δ · |Φ|)-DistP w.r.t. Φ#. uunionsq
Theorem 2 ((ε, d , δ)-XDP⇒(ε,W∞,d , δ ·|Φ|)-XDistP) If A :X → DY provides
(ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ ⊆ X ×X , it provides (ε,W∞,d , δ ·|Φ|)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ#W∞ .
Proof. Assume that A provides (ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ. Let (λ0, λ1) ∈ Φ#W∞ . By
definition, there exists a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ0, λ1) that satisfies supp(γ) ⊆ Φ
and γ ∈ Γ∞,d(λ0, λ1). Then γ minimizes the sensitivity ∆supp(γ); i.e., γ ∈
argmin
γ′∈cp(λ0,λ1)
∆supp(γ′).
Let δ′ = δ · |Φ|. Let R ⊆ Y such that A#(λ0)[R] > δ′. Analogously to the
proof for Theorem 1, we obtain A#(λ1)[R] > 0. Then it follows from supp(γ) ⊆ Φ
and (ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ that:
A#(λ0)[R]− δ′
A#(λ1)[R]
≤ max
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ)
A(x0)[R]− δ
A(x1)[R]
≤ max
(x0,x1)∈supp(γ)
eεd(x0,x1)
=eεW∞,d (λ0,λ1). (by γ ∈ Γ∞,d(λ0, λ1))
Therefore A provides (ε,W∞,d , δ′)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ
#
W∞ . uunionsq
B.2 Distribution Privacy with Attacker’s Close Beliefs
Next we show the propositions on distribution privacy with an attacker’s beliefs.
Proposition 1 (XDistP with close beliefs) Let A : X → DY provide (ε, d , 0)-
XDistP w.r.t. some Ψ ⊆ X × X . If an attacker has (c, d)-close beliefs, then for
all (λ0, λ1) ∈ Ψ and all R ⊆ Y, we have A#(λ˜0)[R] ≤ eε(d(λ0,λ1)+2c) ·A#(λ˜1)[R].
Proof. We obtain the proposition by:
A#(λ˜0)[R] ≤ eεc ·A#(λ0)[R] (by d(λ0, λ˜0) ≤ c)
≤ eε(d(λ0,λ1)+c) ·A#(λ1)[R]
≤ eε(d(λ0,λ1)+2c) ·A#(λ˜1)[R] (by d(λ1, λ˜1) ≤ c).
uunionsq
Similarly, we say that the attacker has close beliefs w.r.t an adjacency relation
Ψ if for each (λ0, λ1) ∈ Ψ , we have (λ˜0, λ0) ∈ Ψ and (λ1, λ˜1) ∈ Ψ . Then we obtain:
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Proposition 2 (DistP with close beliefs) Let A : X → DY provide (ε, δ)-
DistP w.r.t. an adjacency relation Ψ ⊆ DX × DX . Let δ′ = (1 + eε + e2ε)δ. If
an attacker has close beliefs w.r.t. Ψ , then we obtain (3ε, δ′)-DistP against the
attacker, i.e., for all (λ0, λ1) ∈ Ψ and all R ⊆ Y, we have:
A#(λ˜0)[R] ≤ e3ε ·A#(λ˜1)[R] + δ′.
Proof. We obtain the proposition by:
A#(λ˜0)[R] ≤ eε ·A#(λ0)[R] + δ (by (λ˜0, λ0) ∈ Ψ)
≤ eε(eε ·A#(λ1)[R] + δ) + δ (by (λ0, λ1) ∈ Ψ)
≤ eε(e2ε ·A#(λ˜1)[R] + (1 + eε)δ) + δ (by (λ1, λ˜1) ∈ Ψ)
≤ e3ε ·A#(λ˜1)[R] + (1 + eε + e2ε)δ. uunionsq
B.3 Point Obfuscation by Distribution Obfuscation
Next we show that DP is an instance of DistP if an adjacency relation includes
pairs of point distributions.
Definition 13 (Point distribution). For each x ∈ X , the point distribution
ηx of x is the distribution over X such that: ηx[x′] = 1 if x′ = x, and ηx[x′] = 0
otherwise.
Lemma 1. Let Φ ⊆ X × X . For any (x0, x1) ∈ Φ, we have (ηx0 , ηx1) ∈ Φ#W∞ .
Proof. Let (x0, x1) ∈ Φ. We define γ ∈ D(X × X ) by: γ[x, x′] = 1 if x = x0 and
x′ = x1, and γ[x, x′] = 0 otherwise. Then γ is the only coupling between ηx0
and ηx1 , hence γ ∈ Γ∞,d(ηx0 , ηx1). Also supp(γ) = {(x0, x1)} ⊆ Φ. Therefore by
definition, we obtain (ηx0 , ηx1) ∈ Φ#W∞ . uunionsq
Theorem 4 (DistP ⇒ DP and XDistP ⇒ XDP) Let ε ∈ R≥0, Φ ⊆ X × X ,
and A : X → DY be a randomized algorithm.
1. If A provides (ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t. Φ#, it provides (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Φ.
2. If A provides (ε,W∞,d , δ)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ
#
W∞ , it provides (ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ.
Proof. We prove the first claim as follows. Assume that A provides (ε, δ)-DistP
w.r.t. Φ#. Let (x0, x1) ∈ Φ, and ηx0 and ηx1 be the point distributions, defined in
Definition 13. By Lemma 1 and Φ#W∞ ⊆ Φ#, we have (ηx0 , ηx1) ∈ Φ#. It follows
from (ε, δ)-DistP that for any R ⊆ Y, we obtain:
A(x0)[R] = A
#(ηx0)[R] ≤ eε ·A#(ηx1)[R] + δ = eε ·A(x1)[R] + δ.
Hence A provides (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Φ.
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(a) Composition  with shared input.
A1 •A0
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-
-
?
-
x0 (∼ λ)
x1 (∼ λ)
y0
y1
(b) Composition • with independent inputs.
Fig. 21: Two kinds of sequential compositions  and •.
Next we show the second claim. Assume that A provides (ε,W∞,d , δ)-XDistP
w.r.t. Φ#W∞ . Let (x0, x1) ∈ Φ, and ηx0 and ηx1 be the point distributions. By
Lemma 1, we have (ηx0 , ηx1) ∈ Φ#W∞ . Then for any R ⊆ Y, we obtain:
A(x0)[R] = A
#(ηx0)[R]
≤ eεW∞,d (ηx0 ,ηx1 ) ·A#(ηx1)[R] + δ (by XDistP of A)
= eεd(x0,x1) ·A(x1)[R] + δ
where the last equality follows from the definition of W∞,d . Hence A provides
(ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ. uunionsq
B.4 Sequential Compositions  and •
In this section we show two kinds of compositionality.
Sequential Composition  with Shared Input We first present the defi-
nition of the sequential composition with shared input (Fig. 21a).
Definition 14 (Sequential composition ). Given two randomized algo-
rithms A0 : X → DY0 and A1 : Y0 × X → DY1, we define the sequential
composition of A0 and A1 as the randomized algorithm A1  A0 : X → DY1
such that: for any x ∈ X , (A1 A0)(x) = A1(A0(x), x)).
Then we show that it is harder to obfuscate distributions when an identical
input is applied to the mechanism multiple times.
Proposition 3 (Sequential composition  of (ε, δ)-DistP) Let Φ ⊆ X×X .
If A0 : X → DY0 provides (ε0, δ0)-DistP w.r.t. Φ# and for each y0 ∈ Y0, A1(y0) :
X → DY1 provides (ε1, δ1)-DistP w.r.t. Φ# then the sequential composition A1
A0 provides (ε0 + ε1, (δ0 + δ1) · |Φ|)-DistP w.r.t. Φ#.
Proof. By Theorem 4, A0 provides (ε0, δ0)-DP w.r.t. Φ, and for each y0 ∈ Y0,
A1(y0) provides (ε1, δ1)-DP w.r.t. Φ. By the sequential composition theorem for
DP mechanisms, A1A0 provides (ε0 + ε1, δ0 + δ1)-DP w.r.t. Φ. By Theorem 1,
A1 A0 provides (ε0 + ε1, (δ0 + δ1) · |Φ|)-DistP w.r.t. Φ#.
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The compositionality for XDistP can be shown analogously to Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 (Sequential composition  of (ε, δ)-XDistP) Let Φ ⊆ X ×
X . If A0 : X → DY0 provides (ε0,W∞,d , δ0)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ#W∞ and for each
y0 ∈ Y0, A1(y0) : X → DY1 provides (ε1,W∞,d , δ1)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ#W∞ then the
sequential composition A1  A0 provides (ε0 + ε1,W∞,d , (δ0 + δ1) · |Φ|)-XDistP
w.r.t. Φ#W∞ .
Proof. By Theorem 4, A0 provides (ε0, d , δ0)-XDP w.r.t. Φ, and for each y0 ∈ Y0,
A1(y0) provides (ε1, d , δ1)-XDP w.r.t. Φ. By the sequential composition theorem
for XDP mechanisms, A1  A0 provides (ε0 + ε1, d , δ0 + δ1)-XDP w.r.t. Φ. By
Theorem 2, A1 A0 provides (ε0 + ε1,W∞,d , (δ0 + δ1) · |Φ|)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ#W∞ .
Sequential Composition • with Independent Sampling We first note
that the lifting of the sequential composition (A1 A0)# does not coincide with
the sequential composition of the liftings A1
#  A1#. Then the latter is a
randomized algorithm A1
#  A0# : DX → DY1 such that for any λ ∈ DX ,
(A1
#  A0#)(λ) = A1#(A0#(λ), λ). Then each of A0 and A1 receives an input
independently sampled from λ. This is different from A1 A0, in which A0 and
A1 share an identical input drawn from λ, as shown in Figure 21a.
To see this difference in detail, we deal with another definition of sequential
composition.
Definition 15 (Sequential composition •). Given two randomized algo-
rithms A0 : X → DY0 and A1 : Y0 × X → DY1, we define the sequential
composition of A0 and A1 as the randomized algorithm A1 •A0 : X ×X → DY1
such that: for any x0, x1 ∈ X , (A1 •A0)(x0, x1) = A1(A0(x0), x1)).
Then the lifting of the sequential composition (A1 •A0)# coincides with the
sequential composition of the liftings A1
# •A1# in the sense that for any λ0, λ1 ∈
DX ,
(A1 •A0)#(λ0×λ1) = A1#(A0#(λ0), λ1) = (A1# •A1#)(λ0, λ1), (3)
where λ0×λ1 is the probability distribution over X ×X such that for all x0, x1 ∈
X , (λ0 × λ1)[x0, x1] = λ0[x0]λ1[x1].
To show the compositionality for distribution privacy, we introduce an oper-
ator  between binary relations Ψ0 and Ψ1 by:
Ψ0  Ψ1 = {(λ0 × λ1, λ′0 × λ′1) | (λ0, λ′0) ∈ Ψ0, (λ1, λ′1) ∈ Ψ1}.
Proposition 5 (Sequential composition • of (ε, δ)-DistP) Let Ψ ⊆ DX ×
DX . If A0 : X → DY0 provides (ε0, δ0)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ and for each y0 ∈ Y0,
A1(y0) : X → DY1 provides (ε1, δ1)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ then the sequential composi-
tion A1 •A0 provides (ε0 + ε1, δ0 + δ1)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ  Ψ .
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A0#
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Fig. 22: Sequential composition A1
# A0# involves two independent samplings
from λ.
Proof. By the definition of DistP, we have that A0
# provides (ε0, δ0)-DP w.r.t.
Ψ and for each y0 ∈ Y0, A1(y0)# provides (ε1, δ1)-DP w.r.t. Ψ . By the sequential
composition theorem for DP mechanisms and Equation (3), (A1 •A0)# provides
(ε0+ε1, δ0+δ1)-DP w.r.t. Ψ Ψ . Therefore A1•A0 provides (ε0+ε1, δ0+δ1)-DistP
w.r.t. Ψ  Ψ .
For brevity, we omit the case of XDistP.
Finally, we remark that the comparison of the compositions with shared input
and with independent input is also discussed from the viewpoint of quantitative
information flow in [22].
B.5 Post-processing and Pre-processing
Next we show that distribution privacy is immune to the post-processing. For
A0 : X → DY and A1 : Y → DZ, we define A1◦A0 by: (A1◦A0)(x) = A1(A0(x)).
Proposition 6 (Post-processing) Let Ψ ⊆ DX ×DX , and W : DX ×DX →
R≥0 be a metric. Let A0 : X → DY, and A1 : Y → DZ.
1. If A0 provides (ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ then so does the composite function A1 ◦
A0.
2. If A0 provides (ε,W , δ)-XDistP w.r.t. Ψ then so does the composite function
A1 ◦A0.
Proof. Let (λ0, λ1) ∈ Ψ . Since every randomized algorithm is a convex combina-
tion of deterministic algorithms, there are a distribution µ over an index set I
and deterministic algorithms A1,i : Ui → R such that A1 =
∑
i∈I µ[i]A1,i. Then
we obtain:
(A1 ◦A0)#(λ0)[R]
=
∑
x0∈X λ0[x0] · (A1 ◦A0)(x0)[R]
=
∑
i∈I µ[i]
∑
x0∈X λ0[x0] · (A1,i ◦A0)(x0)[R]
=
∑
i∈I µ[i]
∑
x0∈X λ0[x0] ·A0(x0)[Ui]
=
∑
i∈I µ[i] ·A0#(λ0)[Ui]. (4)
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Then we show the first claim as follows. Assume that A0 provides (ε, δ)-DistP
w.r.t. Ψ .
(A1 ◦A0)#(λ0)[R]
=
∑
i∈I µ[i] ·A0#(λ0)[Ui] (by (4))
≤∑i∈I µ[i] · (eε ·A0#(λ1)[Ui] + δ)
(by (ε, δ)-DistP of A0
#)
=
∑
i∈I µ[i] ·
(
eε ·∑x1 λ1[x1]A0(x1)[Ui] + δ)
=
∑
i∈I µ[i] ·
(
eε ·∑x1 λ1[x1](A1,i ◦A0)(x1)[R] + δ)
= eε ·
(∑
i∈I µ[i] · (A1,i ◦A0)#(λ1)[R]
)
+ δ
= eε · (A1 ◦A0)#(λ1))[R] + δ.
Therefore A1 ◦A0 provides (ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ .
Analogously, we show the second claim. Assume that A0 provides (ε,W , δ)-
XDistP w.r.t. Ψ .
(A1 ◦A0)#(λ0)[R]
=
∑
i∈I
µ[i] ·A0#(λ0)[Ui] (by (4))
≤
∑
i∈I
µ[i] · (eε·W (λ0,λ1) ·A0#(λ1)[Ui] + δ)
(by (ε,W , δ)-XDistP of A0
#)
= eε·W (λ0,λ1) ·
(∑
i∈I
µ[i]·(A1,i ◦A0)#(λ1)[R]
)
+ δ
= eε·W (λ0,λ1)·(A1 ◦A0)#(λ1))[R] + δ.
Therefore A1 ◦A0 provides (ε,W , δ)-XDistP w.r.t. Ψ . uunionsq
We then show a property on pre-processing.
Proposition 7 (Pre-processing) Let c ∈ R≥0, Ψ ⊆ DX × DX , and W :
DX × DX → R≥0 be a metric.
1. If T : DX → DX is a (c, Ψ)-stable transformation and A : X → DY provides
(ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t Ψ , then A ◦ T provides (c ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t Ψ .
2. If T : DX → DX is a (c,W )-stable transformation and A : X → DY
provides (ε,W , δ)-XDistP, then A ◦ T provides (c ε,W , δ)-XDistP.
Proof. We show the first claim as follows. Assume that A provides (ε, δ)-DistP
w.r.t. Ψ . Let (λ, λ′) ∈ Ψ , and R ⊆ Y. Then we have:
(A ◦ T )#(λ)[R] = A#(T#(λ))[R]
≤ ecεA#(T#(λ′))[R]
= ecε(A ◦ T )#(λ′)[R].
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Therefore A ◦ T provides (c ε, δ)-DistP.
Next we show the second claim. Assume that A provides (ε,W , δ)-XDistP.
Let λ, λ′ ∈ DX , and R ⊆ Y. Then we obtain:
(A ◦ T )#(λ)[R] = A#(T#(λ))[R]
≤ eεW (T#(λ),T#(λ′))A#(T#(λ′))[R]
≤ ecεW (λ,λ′)(A ◦ T )#(λ′)[R].
Therefore A ◦ T provides (c ε,W , δ)-XDistP. uunionsq
B.6 Probabilistic Distribution Privacy (PDistP)
We next introduce an approximate notion of distribution privacy analogously
to the notion of probabilistic differential privacy (PDP) [48]. Intuitively, a ran-
domized algorithm provides (ε, δ)-probabilistic distribution privacy if it provides
ε-distribution privacy with probability at least (1− δ).
Definition 16 (Probabilistic distribution privacy). Let Ψ ⊆ DX×DX . We
say that a randomized algorithm A : X → DY provides (ε, δ)-probabilistic dis-
tribution privacy (PDistP) w.r.t.Ψ if the lifting A# provides (ε, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy w.r.t. Ψ , i.e., for all (λ, λ′) ∈ Ψ , there exists an R′ ⊆ Y such
that A#(λ)[R′] ≤ δ, A#(λ′)[R′] ≤ δ, and that for all R ⊆ Y, we have:
A#(λ)[R \R′] ≤ eε ·A#(λ′)[R \R′]
A#(λ′)[R \R′] ≤ eε ·A#(λ)[R \R′],
where the probability space is taken over the choices of randomness in A.
B.7 Relationships between PDistP and DistP
In this section we show the relationships between PDistP and DistP. By defini-
tion, (ε, 0)-DistP is equivalent to (ε, 0)-PDistP. In general, however, (ε, δ)-DistP
does not imply (ε, δ)-PDistP, while (ε, δ)-PDistP implies (ε, δ)-DistP.
Proposition 8 ((ε, 0)-PDistP ⇔ (ε, 0)-DistP) A randomized algorithm A pro-
vides (ε, 0)-PDistP w.r.t. an adjacency relation Ψ iff it provides (ε, 0)-DistP
w.r.t. Ψ .
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. uunionsq
Proposition 9 ((ε, δ)-PDistP ⇒ (ε, δ)-DistP) If a randomized algorithm A pro-
vides (ε, δ)-PDistP w.r.t. an adjacency relation Ψ , then it provides (ε, δ)-DistP
w.r.t. Ψ .
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Proof. Let Ψ ⊆ DX × DX , (λ, λ′) ∈ Ψ , R ⊆ Y, and A : X → DY be any
randomized algorithm that provides (ε, δ)-PDistP w.r.t. Ψ . Then there exists an
R′ ⊆ Y such that A#(λ)[R′] ≤ δ, and A#(λ)[R \R′] ≤ eε ·A#(λ′)[R \R′]. Hence
we obtain:
A#(λ)[R] = A#(λ)[R \R′] + A#(λ)[R′]
≤ eε ·A#(λ′)[R \R′] + δ
≤ eε ·A#(λ′)[R] + δ.
Therefore A provides (ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ . uunionsq
B.8 Properties of the Tupling Mechanism
In this section we show properties of the tupling mechanism.
We first present a minor result with δ = 0.
Proposition 10 ((εA, 0)-DistP of the tupling mechanism) If A provides (εA, 0)-
DP w.r.t. Φ, then the (k, ν,A)-tupling mechanism Q tpk,ν,A provides (εA, 0)-DistP
w.r.t. Φ#.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ X ×X . Since A provides (εA, 0)-DP w.r.t. Φ, Theorem 1 implies
that A provides (εA, 0)-DistP w.r.t. Φ
#.
Let (λ0, λ1) ∈ Φ# and R ⊆ Yk+1 such that Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[R] > 0. Since the
dummies are uniformly distributed over Y, we have Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[R] > 0. Let y¯ =
(y1, y2, . . . , yk+1) ∈ R be an output of Q tpk,ν,A. Since i is uniformly drawn from
{1, 2, . . . , k + 1} in the mechanism Q tpk,ν,A, the output of A appears as the i-th
element yi of the tuple y¯ with probability
1
k+1 . For each b = 0, 1, when an input
x is drawn from λb, the probability that A outputs yi is:
A#(λb)[yi] =
∑
x∈X λb[x]A(x)[yi].
On the other hand, for each j 6= i, the probability that yj is drawn from the
dummy distribution ν is given by ν[yj ]. Therefore, the probability that the mech-
anism Q tpk,ν,A outputs the tuple y¯ is:
Q tpk,ν,A(λb)[y¯] =
1
k+1
∑k+1
i=1 A
#(λb)[yi]
∏
j 6=i ν[yj ].
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Hence we obtain:
Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[R]
Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[R]
=
∑
y¯∈R Q
tp
k,ν,A(λ0)[y¯]∑
y¯∈R Q
tp
k,ν,A(λ1)[y¯]
=
∑
y¯∈R
1
k+1
∑k+1
i=1 A
#(λ0)[yi]
∏
j 6=i ν[yj ]∑
y¯∈R
1
k+1
∑k+1
i=1 A
#(λ1)[yi]
∏
j 6=i ν[yj ]
=
∑
y¯∈R
∑k+1
i=1 A
#(λ0)[yi]∑
y¯∈R
∑k+1
i=1 A
#(λ1)[yi]
(since ν is uniform)
≤ max
y¯∈R
max
i∈{1,2,...,k+1}
A#(λ0)[yi]
A#(λ1)[yi]
≤ eεA (by (εA, 0)-DistP of A w.r.t. Φ#)
Therefore Q tpk,ν,A provides (εA, 0)-DistP w.r.t. Φ
#.
Next we show that the tupling mechanism provides PDistP without any re-
striction on A, i.e., A does not have to provide DP in order for the tupling
mechanism to provides PDistP.
Proposition 11 ((εα, δα)-PDistP of the tupling mechanism) Let k ∈ N>0,
ν be the uniform distribution over Y, A : X → DY, and β, η ∈ [0, 1]. For an
α ∈ R>0, let εα = ln k+(α+β)·|Y|k−α·|Y| and δα = 2 exp
(− 2α2kβ2 ) + η. Then for any
0 < α < k|Y| , the tupling mechanism Q
tp
k,ν,A provides (εα, δα)-PDistP w.r.t Λ
2
β,η,A.
Proof. Let λ0, λ1 ∈ Λβ,η,A, and R ⊆ Yk+1 such that Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[R] > 0. Since
the dummies are uniformly distributed over Y, we have Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[R] > 0. As
in the proof for Proposition 10, for any y¯ = (y1, y2, . . . , yk+1) ∈ R:
Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[y¯]
Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[y¯]
=
∑k+1
i=1 A
#(λ0)[yi]∑k+1
i=1 A
#(λ1)[yi]
. (5)
Recall that in the definition of the tupling mechanism, yi is the output of A while
for each j 6= i, yj is generated from the uniform distribution ν over Y. Hence
the expected value of
∑
j 6=i A
#(λ0)[yj ] is given by
k
|Y| . Therefore it follows from
the Hoeffding’s inequality that for any α > 0, we have:
Pr
[∑
j 6=i A
#(λ0)[yj ] ≥ k|Y| + α
] ≤ exp(− 2α2kβ2 )
Pr
[∑
j 6=i A
#(λ1)[yj ] ≤ k|Y| − α
] ≤ exp(− 2α2kβ2 )
where each yj is independently drawn from ν, hence each of A
#(λ0)[yj ] and
A#(λ1)[yj ] is independent. By δα = 2 exp
(− 2α2kβ2 ), we obtain:
Pr
[∑
j 6=i
A#(λ0)[yj ]≥ k|Y| + α and
∑
j 6=i
A#(λ1)[yj ]≤ k|Y| − α
]
≤δα. (6)
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When y¯ is drawn from Q tpk,ν,A(λ0), let yi be the output of A
#(λ0). Then we
obtain:
Pr
[
Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[y¯]
Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[y¯]
≥ eε
]
= Pr
[ ∑k+1
j=1 A
#(λ0)[yj ]∑k+1
j=1 A
#(λ1)[yj ]
≥ eε
]
(by (5))
= Pr
[ ∑k+1
j=1 A
#(λ0)[yj ]∑k+1
j=1 A
#(λ1)[yj ]
≥
k
|Y| + α+ β
k
|Y| − α
]
(by def. of ε)
≤ Pr
[ ∑k+1
j=1 A
#(λ0)[yj ]∑k+1
j=1 A
#(λ1)[yj ]
≥
k
|Y| + α+ A
#(λ0)[yi]
k
|Y| − α+ A#(λ1)[yi]
]
+ η(
by Pr
[
A#(λ0)[yi] ≤ β
] ≥ 1− η and A#(λ1)[yi] ≥ 0)
= Pr
[ ∑
j 6=i A
#(λ0)[yj ]∑
j 6=i A#(λ1)[yj ]
≥
k
|Y| + α
k
|Y| − α
]
+ η
≤ δα. (by (6))
Then there is an R′ ⊆ Yk+1 such that Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[R′] ≤ δα, and that for any
y¯ ∈ R, y¯ ∈ R′ iff Q
tp
k,ν,A(λ0)[y¯]
Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[y¯]
≥ eε. Then:
Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[R
′] =
∑
y¯∈R′
Q tpk,ν,A(λ1)[y¯]
≤
∑
y¯∈R′
e−ε ·Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[y¯]
= e−ε ·Q tpk,ν,A(λ0)[R′]
≤ δα.
Therefore Q tpk,ν,A provides (εα, δα)-PDistP w.r.t. Λ
2
β,η,A.
Then, we obtain the DistP of the tupling mechanism from Propositions 11
and 9 as follows.
Theorem 3 (DistP of the tupling mechanism) Let k ∈ N>0, ν be the uni-
form distribution over Y, A : X → DY, and β, η ∈ [0, 1]. Given an 0 < α < k|Y| ,
let εα = ln
k+(α+β)·|Y|
k−α·|Y| and δα = 2e
− 2α2
kβ2 + η. Then the (k, ν,A)-tupling mecha-
nism provides (εα, δα)-DistP w.r.t. Λ
2
β,η,A.
Proof. By Proposition 11, Q tpk,ν,A provides (εα, δα)-PDistP w.r.t. Λ
2
β,η,A. Hence
by Proposition 9, Q tpk,ν,A provides (εα, δα)-DistP w.r.t. Λ
2
β,η,A.
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Finally, we note that if A spreads the input distribution (e.g., A provides ε-
DP for a smaller ε), then β becomes smaller (by Proposition 12), hence smaller
values of εα and δα as shown in experimental results in Section 7.
Proposition 12 Let λ ∈ DX , A : X → DY, and y ∈ Y. Then we have
minx∈X λ[x] ≤ A#(λ)[y] ≤ maxx∈X λ[x].
Proof. By A#(λ)[y] =
∑
x′∈X λ[x
′]A(x′)[y], we obtain:
A#(λ)[y] ≤ (max
x∈X
λ[x]
) ·∑x′∈X A(x′)[y] = maxx∈X λ[x]
A#(λ)[y] ≥ (min
x∈X
λ[x]
) ·∑x′∈X A(x′)[y] = minx∈X λ[x].
